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2A Bit About Me
• Associate professor, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA
• Research interests
– Industrial quality control and statistical 
process control (SPC) methods





– My NPS website: http://faculty.nps.edu/rdfricke/
– Course site: http://faculty.nps.edu/rdfricke/Biosurveillance.htm
Bioterrorism in Pop Culture
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“That‟s how it‟s gonna be, 
a little test tube with a-a 
rubber cap that‟s 
deteriorating... A guy steps 
out of Times Square 
Station. Pshht... Smashes 
it on the sidewalk... There 
is a world war right there.” 
“Josh”  
West Wing, 1999
4The New Status Quo?
What is Biosurveillance?
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
HSPD-21 (October 18, 2007): 
– “The term „biosurveillance‟ means the process of active data-
gathering … of biosphere data … in order to achieve early 
warning of health threats, early detection of health events, and 
overall situational awareness of disease activity.” [1]
– “The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall establish 
an operational national epidemiologic surveillance system for 
human health...” [1]
• Syndromic surveillance:
– “…surveillance using health-related data that precede 
diagnosis and signal a sufficient probability of a case or an 
outbreak to warrant further public health response.” [2]
5[1]  www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071018-10.html
[2]  CDC (www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/syndromic.htm, accessed 5/29/07)
Fricker, R.D., Jr., and J.T. Chang, (2008).  A Spatio-temporal Methodology for Real-time Biosurveillance, 
Quality Engineering, 20, 465-477.   See http://www.cdc.gov/BioSense/publichealth.htm for more detailed 
definitions of EED and SA, or http://www.satechnologies.com/situation_awareness/ for SA in general.
Two Purposes of Biosurveillance
• Early event detection (EED): Gathering 
and analyzing data in advance of 
diagnostic case confirmation to give 
early warning of a possible outbreak
• Situational awareness (SA): The real-
time analysis and display of health data 
to monitor the location, magnitude, and 
spread of an outbreak
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7Idea of Biosurveillance: 
Leverage Secondary Health Data
• Ideal is automatic or near 
real-time data analysis
• Use data, methods to 
allow for identification of 
subtle trends not visible 
to individual MD‟s














Derived from “Emerging Health Threats and Health Information Systems: Getting Public Health and Clinical 
Medicine to Real Time Response,” John W. Loonsk, M.D., Associate Director for Informatics, CDC                                      
One System: BioSense
Other Biosurveillance Systems
• In a review of the literature, Bravata et al. (2004) 
identified 115 health surveillance systems, including 9 
syndromic surveillance systems
• Examples:
– Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) developed by the 
CDC
– Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of 
Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE) developed by the 
Department of Defense
– Real-time Outbreak Detection System (RODS) developed by 
the University of Pittsburgh 
• Monterey county public health department uses EARS 
to monitor trends from local hospitals and clinics
9Bravata, D.M., et al. (2004).  Systematic Review: Surveillance Systems for Early Detection of Bioterrorism-
related Diseases, Annals of Internal Medicine, 140, 910-922. 
Biosurveillance Use Widespread
• In 2007-2008, Buehler et al. surveyed public health 
officials in 59 state, territorial, and large local 
jurisdictions
– 52 responded (88% response rate), representing areas 
comprising 94% of US population
– 83% reported conducting syndromic surveillance for a median 
of 3 years
– ER data most commonly used (84%), followed by:
• Outpatient clinic visits (49%)
• OTC medication sales (44%)
• Calls to poison control centers (37%)
• School absenteeism (37%)
– Two-thirds said they are “highly” or “somewhat” likely to 
expand use of biosurveillance in next 2 years
10Buehler, J.W., et al., (2008).  Syndromic Surveillance Practice in the United States: Findings from a Survey of 
State, Territorial, and Selected Local Health Departments, Advances in Disease Surveillance, 6, 1-20. 
Latest Entry: Google Flu Trends 
See www.google.org/flutrends/
11
How Good is Google Flu Trends?
• Google search results correspond to CDC sentinel 
physician data
• Google says it is able to accurately estimate flu levels 
1-2 weeks faster than published CDC reports
12
For more information see: Gisberg, J., et al. (2009).  Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine 
Query Data, Nature, 457, 1012-1014.
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Illustrative Biosurveillance Data
Respiratory Data From “Hospital C”




























Red = Resp,  Orange = Gastro,  Green = Unspecif ied Infection,  Blue = Neuro,  Purple = Rash
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Illustrative Biosurveillance Data







































“To date no bio-terrorist attack has been 
detected in the United Kingdom, or 
elsewhere in the world using syndromic 
surveillance systems.”[1]
[1] Cooper, D.L., et al. (2005).  Can Syndromic Surveillance Data Detect Local Outbreaks of Communicable 
Disease?  A Model Using a Historical Cryptosporidiosis Outbreak, Epidemiology and Infection, 134, 13-20.
Some of the Methodological 
Issues to be Discussed
• Are statistical methods useful for / effective at 
early event detection?
• Can excessive false alarm rates be controlled 
(without compromising detection capabilities)?
• Which algorithms perform best and under what 
conditions?
• What are the appropriate metrics and standards 
for judging algorithm performance?
• Can the barriers keeping SPC researchers from 
fully engaging be surmounted?
17
Issue: Are Statistical Methods 




































































Fricker, R.D., Jr., and H.R. Rolka (2006).  Protecting Against Biological Terrorism: Statistical Issues in 
Electronic Biosurveillance, Chance, 19, 4-13.
• Aerosol release with windborne spread
occurred afternoon of April 2, 1979
– 6 admitted to hospital on April 4
– By end of first week after April 4, 28 onsets
– Out of 96 cases, 64 people eventually died[1]
• Possible conclusions:
– First signs of an outbreak will be either by
a large increase in patients presenting or  
seriously ill patients who will be diagnosed rapidly[2] 
– Thus:
• Syndromic surveillance systems, based on statistical algorithms, 
will be of little value in early detection of bioterrorist outbreaks
• Early on in the outbreak, there will be cases serious enough to 
alert physicians and be given definitive diagnoses[2]
Case Study: Accidental Release of 
Anthrax Spores at Sverdlovsk, USSR
[1] Meselson, M., et al. (1994). The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979, Science, 266, 1202-1208.
[2] Green, M., Syndromic Surveillance for Detecting Bioterrorist Events – The Right Answer to the Wrong 
Question?, briefing at the Naval War College, September 21, 2008.
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[1]
Clinicians vs. Biosurveillance: 
A Simple Simulation
• On average, 100 per day go to area emergency rooms 
with flu-like symptoms
– Standard deviation is 20 people
• CUSUM monitors average number presenting daily
– False signal rate fixed at once per 30 days
• Bio-agent exhibits flu-like symptoms early-on
– Results in increase in number of people presenting at ERs 
with flu-like symptoms
– For those exposed to bio-agent, with probability p some 
people develop extreme symptoms that a clinicians can easily 
diagnose
• Question: What is the probability clinician diagnoses 




~ 50 percent chance clinician detects first if 
probability of an extreme case p=0.01 and 
number presenting from bio-agent n=50/day
~ 50 percent chance clinician detects first 
if p=0.01, n between 8 and 50/day
~ 75 percent chance clinician detects first 
if p=0.025, n between 8 and 50/day
~ 90-95 percent chance clinician detects first 
if p=0.05, n between 10 and 50/day
Results (Shewhart)
22
~ 46 percent chance clinician detects first if 
probability of an extreme case p=0.01 and 
number presenting from bio-agent n=50/day
~ 46-55 percent chance clinician detects first 
if p=0.01, n between 8 and 50/day
~ 74-77 percent chance clinician detects first 
if p=0.025, n between 8 and 50/day
~ 88-95 percent chance clinician detects first 
if p=0.05, n between 10 and 50/day
Results (Shewhart)
23
Simulations suggest there is a role for statistical algorithms in 
biosurveillance when pathogen is hard to diagnose and/or when 
small numbers are presenting
Simulations Indicate Strengths and 
Limitations of Biosurveillance
• These are just simple, illustrative simulations
– However, they suggest biosurveillance for early 
event detection has a role in some situations:
• As a primary detection tool for rare, hard to diagnose 
diseases/agents
• As a back-up to clinicians for moderately sized outbreaks 
that are moderately hard to diagnose
• Seems to me that rigorous, scientific studies 
could help clearly define/refine that role, as 
well as the limitations of biosurveillance
– Added benefit: Surveillance can focus on particular 
outcomes/events…more on that topic to follow
24
Example: Is Biosurveillance
Useful for Detecting Anthrax Attack?
• Nordin et al. (2005) 
used Sverdlovsk to 
model anthrax attack 
on Mall of America
– Modeled rate of 
physician visits for 
respiratory symptoms
– SatScan used
• Would other methods 
have been faster?
• Would astute 
clinicians be faster?
25




• A brief introduction to statistical process 
control (SPC) – from an industrial quality 
control perspective
• A control chart is a statistical tool to 
detect “assignable causes of variation”
• Advantages of control charts
– Graphically displays performance
– Accounts for natural randomness
– Removes subjective decision making
26
For an introduction to industrial SPC, see Montgomery, D.C. (2009).  Introduction to Statistical Quality 





Goal: detect a shift 
before not capable
27
How Industry Uses Control Charts
Statistical Basis of Control Charts
• Choose control limits to guide actions
– If points fall within control limits, assume process 
in control  No action required
– If point or points fall outside control limits, evidence 
process out of control  Look for “assignable 
causes”
• Competing requirements for control limits
– When in-control, want small chance of point falling 
outside control limits (i.e., low false alarm rate)
– When out-of-control, want high chance of falling out 
of control limits (i.e., high power)
28
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Univariate Statistical Process 
Control (SPC) Methods
• Shewhart (1931)
– Stop when observation (or statistic) exceeds pre-
defined threshold
– Better for detecting large shifts/changes
• CUSUM (Page, 1954)
– Stop when cumulative sum of observations exceeds 
threshold
– Better for detecting small shifts/changes
• EWMA (Roberts, 1959)
– Stop when weighted average of observations 
exceeds threshold
– Very similar in performance to CUSUM
30
Shewhart (“X-bar”) Charts
• Observations follow an in-control distribution 
f0(x), for which we often want to monitor the 
mean of the distribution
• If interested in detecting both increases and 
decreases in the mean, choose thresholds h1
and h2 such that
• Sequentially observe values of xi; stop and 
conclude the mean may have shifted at time i













1ix h 2ix h
Example of a Shewhart (    ) Chart
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• If only interested in detecting increases in the 
mean, can use a one-sided test
– Sequentially observe values of xi; stop and conclude 
the mean may have shifted at time i if
• Industrial applications often set thresholds as 
multiples of process standard deviation
• Can also use Shewhart charts to monitor 
process variation along with mean
– In industrial SPC, called “s-charts” or “R-charts”
ix h
33
Average Run Length (ARL)
• ARL is a measure of chart performance
– In-control ARL or ARL0 is expected number of 
observations between false signals
• Assuming f0(x) known, time between false signals is 
geometrically distributed, so
• Larger ARL0 are preferred
– Out-of-control ARL or ARL1 is expected number of 
observations until a true signal for a given out-of-
control condition















Example: Monitoring a 
Process with Xi~N(m,s
2)
• With 3s control limits, when in-control, 
probability an observation is outside the control 
limits is p = 0.0027, so
– If sampling at fixed times, says will get a false signal 
on average once every 370 time periods
• For out-of-control condition where mean shifts 
up or down 1s, probability an observation is 
outside the control limits is p = 0.0227, so
– For a 2s shift, 
– Etc.
0ARL 1 0.0027 370 
1ARL 1 0.0227 44 
1ARL 1 0.1814 5.5 
Univariate CUSUM
• The two-sided CUSUM plots two statistics:
typically starting with 
– Stop when either
– A one-sided test only uses one of the statistics
• Must choose both k and h
– E.g., Setting h =5s and                 works well for 
1s shift in the mean:











C C x k







   
   
000 
 CC
0 0 or C h C h
   
/ 2k s
(Two-Sided) CUSUM Chart Example
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Montgomery, D.C. (2009).  Introduction to Statistical Quality Control,  John Wiley & Sons, p. 407.
Univariate EWMA
• The EWMA (exponentially weighted moving 
average) plots or tracks
– xi is the observation at time i
– is a constant that governs how much 
weight is put on historical observations
• l=1: EWMA reduces to the Shewhart
• Typical values: 
• With appropriate choice of l, can be made to 
perform similar to Shewhart or CUSUM
37





Montgomery, D.C. (2009).  Introduction to Statistical Quality Control,  John Wiley & Sons, p. 421.
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Some Multivariate SPC Methods
• Hotelling‟s T2 (1947)
– Stop when statistical distance to observation
exceeds threshold h
– Like Shewhart, good at detecting large shifts
• Lowry et al.‟s MEWMA (1992)
– Multivariate generalization of univariate EWMA
• At each time, calculate 
• Stop when  
• Crosier‟s MCUSUM (1988)
– Cumulates vectors componentwise
– As with CUSUM, good at detecting small shifts
)()( 12 μXΣμX  T
    11i i il l    z x μ z
1





• Crosier (1988) proposed various MCUSUMs;
His preferred defines
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Applying SPC Methods to 
Biourveillance
• Motivation: In both industrial SPC and in 
biosurveillance, goal is to detect anomalies 
• In industrial setting, control charts used to 
monitor production and test for a change level 
of quality
– Have parameter(s) of quality characteristic shifted?
• In biosurveillance, goal is to monitor for 
indications of changes in population health
– Has distribution of leading indicators shifted in 
some meaningful (i.e., worrisome) way?
41
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Issue: SPC Methods Don’t Translate 
Directly to Biosurveillance Problem
• Dependent data
– Industrial methods assume independence
• Nonstationary data
– No control over “in-control” distribution
• Systematic effects
– Seasonal, day-of-the-week and other effects in data
• Transient “out-of-control” conditions 
– Outbreaks/attacks begin, peak, and subside
• Vague alternative hypotheses
– Detect only bioterrorism or natural diseases too?
– Which diseases and/or outbreak manifestations?
• Classical epidemiology is largely retrospective while 
biosurveillance is a prospective problem
Retrospective is hard enough       Prospective detection provides
new challenges
Related: Classical Epidemiology 
Doesn’t Translate Directly Either
43
Original map by Dr. John Snow showing clusters 
of cholera cases in London epidemic of 1854.[1]
[1]  Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epidemiology, accessed March 24, 2009.
Identify as early as possible when an outbreak occurs…
Lots of New Methods Have Been 
Proposed, Most Illustrated with Data
• For example:
– RTR-based methods: see Fricker and Chang, 2008
– CUSUM-based methods with adaptive regression: see Fricker et al., 2008
– Directional MEWMA and MCUSUM: see Joner et al., 2008, and Fricker, 2007
– Bayesian network-based methods: see for example Rolka et al., 2007
– Distance-based methods: see Forsberg et al., 2006
– Bayesian dynamic models: see, for example, Sebastiani et al., 2006
– Wavelet-based methods: see Shmueli, 2005, Zhang et al., 2003, etc.
– Point process model-based methods: see Brookmeyer and Stroup, 2004
– Rule-based methods: see, for example, Wong, 2003
– Hidden Markov models: see Le Strat and Carrat, 1999
• And some methods are in use, such as:
– SatScan: see, for example, Kulldorff 2001 and subsequent literature
– GLM-based methods: see, for example, Kleinman et al., 2004
– EARS‟ C1, C2, and C3 methods: see Hutwagner, et al., 2005
44
Raises Questions About Which 
Method or Methods to Use and When
• Though many methods have been 
proposed, the sheer plethora raises 
questions:
– Under what conditions do the various 
methods work best?
– Is a method more sensitive than others to 
detecting a particular type of outbreak?
– Conversely, is a method overly sensitive to 
particular assumptions about the data?
– How to compare the methods to determine?
45
Side Comment: More Sophisticated 
Methods Aren’t Always Better
• Common criticism of traditional SPC methods is 
jump change in mean is artificial
• Chang and Fricker (1999) assessed what 
happens when mean is monotonically 
increasing
– Compared performance of standard SPC methods 
(CUSUM and EWMA) to likelihood ratio test (LRT)
• Result:  LRT explicitly designed for the problem 
often outperformed by SPC methods designed 
for jump change in mean
Chang, J.T., and R.D. Fricker, Jr. (1999).  Detecting When a Monotonically Increasing Mean has Crossed a 
Threshold, Journal of Quality Technology, 31, 217-233.
46
Issue: Looking for Everything Means 
It’s Harder to Find Any One Thing
47
www.ntoddblog.org/photos/random_pics/wheresobl.jpg
It’s a Hard Problem Even When You 






Solution: Restricting Focus Can Help
• To greatest extent possible, specify 
characteristics of events to be detected
– Where‟s Waldo: Only look for red and white stripes
– In biosurveillance, only signal when rates of 
disease increase
• E.g., MCPHD tell me EARS signals on decreases
• Think about it as follows: 
– Restricted focus should decrease false positives
– Thus, can lower thresholds for greater detection
• In SPC terms, restricting focus to increases results in 
smaller ARL1 for fixed ARL0 or larger ARL0 for same ARL1
51
Some Possible Foci 
• Dembeck, Kortepeter, and Pavlin (2007) identified 
eleven “clues to a deliberate epidemic”:
1. A highly unusual event with large numbers of casualties




6. Lower attack rates in protected individuals
7. Dead animals
8. Reverse or unnatural spread
9. Unusual disease manifestation
10. Downwind plume pattern
11. Direct evidence
 Perhaps a starting point?
Dembek, Z.F., Kortepeter, M.G., and J.A. Pavlin. (2007).  Discernment Between Deliberate and Natural 
Infectious Disease Outbreaks, Epidemiology and Infection, 135, 353-371.
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• F0 ~ N(0,1)
• F1 ~ 
56
• F0 ~ N2((0,0)
T,I)




• F0 ~ N2((0,0)
T,I)
• F1 ~ N2((0,0)
T,s2I)
Examples: 
“One-sided” MEWMA and MCUSUM
• Joner et al. (2008) modified the MEWMA to only signal 
increases in the mean vector:
• Similarly, Fricker (2007) modified Crosier‟s MCUSUM 
by using                                                           for
• However, it‟s not as simple as turning omni-directional 
methods into “one-sided” tests
– The tests above are better for the biosurveillance problem
– But more precise alternatives would allow even more focused 
(i.e., more sensitive/powerful) tests to be developed
58
[1] Joner, M.D., Jr., et al. (2008).  A One-Sided MEWMA Chart for Health Surveillance, Quality and Reliability 
Engineering International, 24, 503-519.
[2] Fricker, R.D., Jr. (2007).  Directionally Sensitive Multivariate Statistical Process Control Methods with 
Application to Syndromic Surveillance, Advances in Disease Surveillance, 3:1.
    1max , 1i i il l    z 0 x μ z
  , 1, ,max 0, 1 /i j i j i j j iS S X k Cm     
 ,1 ,, ,i i i dS SS 
Issue: What Are the Appropriate 
Metrics for Biosurveillance?
• SPC methods are sequential hypothesis tests
– At each time period, do a simple hypothesis test on 
a set of data – but then repeat test over and over
– “Many papers have addressed the problem of on-line 
surveillance, but the mistake of not noting the sequential 
type of decision situation is quite common.”[1]
• Issue: Concepts from standard hypothesis 
testing – such as sensitivity and specificity –
do not translate well to this type of problem
– Yet most common biosurveillance metrics are 
“sensitivity, specificity, and timeliness”
59
[1] Sonesson, C. and D. Bock (2003).  A Review and Discussion of Prospective Statistical Surveillance in 
Public Health, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 166, 5-21.
Sensitivity and Specificity 
Classically Defined
• Sensitivity and specificity are statistical metrics 
for binary classification tests
• Consider a test for a disease applied to both 
sick and health people where test outcome 
can be positive (sick) or negative (healthy)
• Sensitivity: a measure of how well a test 
correctly classifies sick people as sick
• Specificity: a measure of how well a test 
correctly classifies healthy people as healthy
60
Calculating the Sensitivity and 
Specificity of a Binary Test
• E.g., administer N independent tests and classify each 
outcome:
– True positives (TP) are sick people correctly diagnosed
– False positives (FP) are healthy people wrongly diagnosed
– True negatives (TN) are healthy people correctly diagnosed

















ROC Curves Depict How Sensitivity 



























• With a classical hypothesis test, with one 
observation or set of observations we 
must decide whether Ho or Ha is true
• ROC curve shows relationship between 
sensitivity and specificity for all choices of 
a “threshold” 
But What Happens When 
Hypothesis Test Repeatedly Applied?
• Rather than administer the test to N independent 
people, what if we kept administering the test to the 
same person over and over?
– What does sensitivity and specificity mean now?
– Can we use an ROC curve to describe test performance?
• Defining sensitivity of a surveillance system test:
“The sensitivity of a surveillance system can be considered on 
two levels. First, at the level of case reporting, sensitivity refers to 
the proportion of cases of a disease (or other health-related 
event) detected by the surveillance system. Second, sensitivity 
can refer to the ability to detect outbreaks, including the ability to 
monitor changes in the number of cases over time.”
63[1] Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems, MMWR, July 27, 2001/ 
50(RR13);1-35.
Attempts to Define the 
Sensitivity of a Sequential Test
• “Sensitivity is defined as the number of days with true 
alarms divided by the number of days with outbreaks.”[1]
• “Sensitivity can be assessed by estimating the proportion of 
cases of a disease or health condition detected by the 
surveillance system.  Sensitivity can also be considered as 
the ability of the system to detect unusual events.”[2]
• “Sensitivity is the probability that a public health event of 
interest will be detected in the data given the event really 
occurred.”[3]
• “Sensitivity is the probability of an alarm given an 
outbreak.”[4]
64
[1] Reis, B.Y., Pagano, M., and K.D. Mandl (2003).  Using Temporal Context to Improve Biosurveillance, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100, 1961-1965.
[2] Lawson, A.B. and Kleinman,K. (2005).  Spatial & Syndromic Surveillance for Public Health, John Wiley & 
Sons, p. 14.
[3] Lombardo, J.S. and D.L. Breckeridge (2007).  Disease Surveillance: A Public Health Informatics 
Approach, Wiley-Interscience, p. 45.
[4] Lombardo, J.S. and D.L. Breckeridge (2007).  Disease Surveillance: A Public Health Informatics 
Approach, Wiley-Interscience, p. 413.
Two Methods with Same Specificity 
But Very Different Performance
• Consider the following performance of two methods:
– Based on the table 
both have sensitivity
equal to 4/15
– But Method 2 is clearly
better
65From Fraker, S.E., Woodall, W.H., and S. Mousavi (2008).  Performance Metrics for Surveillance Schemes, 
Quality Engineering, 20, 451-464.
Metrics for Classical Hypothesis Tests 
Inappropriate for Sequential Tests 
66
“Evaluation by the significance level, power, 
specificity, and sensitivity which is useful for a 
fixed sample is not appropriate in a surveillance 
situation without modification since they have no 
unique value unless the time period is fixed.  
Also, a formulation of an optimality criterion for 
surveillance must naturally take into account the 
delay time in detection, since the aim of a 
surveillance method is quick detection.”
Frisen, M. and C. Sonesson (2005).  Optimal Surveillance, Spatial & Syndromic Surveillance for Public 
Health, chapter 3, A.B. Lawson and K. Kleinman, eds., John Wiley & Sons, 31-52.
Consider the Following Relevant 
Metrics for Sequential Testing
• If we keep applying the test to a healthy 
person over and over we will eventually get a 
false positive
– One useful measure of performance is the 
expected time between false positives
• The larger the better
• Assume the repeated testing used to quickly 
identify when a healthy person gets sick
– Another useful measure is the expected time from 
when the person gets sick until the first positive test 
• The smaller the better
67
But Biosurvellance Performance Not 
Fully Described by ARL-type Metrics 
• Two aspects of biosurveillance differ 
from industrial SPC practice
– Because outbreaks are transient, it is 
possible for the algorithm to miss them
• So, it‟s not clear how to calculate ARL1
• Not the case in industrial SPC, assuming 
persistent out-of-control conditions
– Often algorithms not re-set after a signal
• Sequences or clusters of signals taken as 
stronger evidence of outbreak
• As a result, even less clear how to calculate 
ARL1 68
Many Metrics Have Been Proposed 
in the Biosurveillance Literature
• “Substantially more metrics have been proposed in the public 
health surveillance literature than in the industrial monitoring 
literature.”[1]
• Examples:
– Sensitivity, specificity, and timeliness
– Sensitivity and predictive value positive
– Recurrence interval
– Area under the ROC curve, activity monitoring operating 
characteristic (AMOC) curve, and free response operating 
characteristic (FROC) curve
– Average run length (ARL), average overlapping run length (AORL), 
average time to signal given an outbreak
– Expected delay and conditional expected delay (CED)
– Probability of successful detection (PSD)
– Average time between signal events (ATBSE) and average signal 
event length (ASEL)
69[1] Fraker, S.E., Woodall, W.H., and S. Mousavi (2008).  Performance Metrics for Surveillance Schemes, 
Quality Engineering, 20, 451-464.
A Set of Commonly Accepted 
Metrics Critical to Advance Practice
• The field needs a set of standard metrics 
– Without them, it‟s virtually impossible to synthesize 
and compare results across the literature
• Recommend run length-based metrics 
augmented with a metric for missed outbreaks
– Retrospective and prospective methods require 
different metrics
• Perhaps different metrics appropriate for 
systems that reset vs. not reset after a signal
– Which then leads to questions about what the 
system is monitoring for: natural outbreaks versus 
bioterrorism…
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Issue: What Are We Trying to Detect: 
Natural Disease or Bioterrorism?
• It‟s a question about the primary purpose of a 
biosurveillance system
• Basic issue: 
– A system designed to detect bioterrorism will be 
useful for detecting natural diseases
– But a system focused on natural disease outbreaks 
could miss bioterrorism
• The problem: If a system that is signaling 
during a natural disease outbreak is not re-set, 
then it cannot detect bioterrorism
– The smoke alarm that goes off every time you use 
the oven is of little use detecting real fires when 
you‟re cooking
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A Smart Bioterrorist Would Attack 
During the Flu Season
• I‟m unclear on the primary purpose
– But the answer has implications for both 
choice of appropriate metrics and how the 
biosurveillance system is operated
• E.g., if the goal is bioterrorism detection:
– During natural disease outbreak, should 
revise background incidence rate so system 
can look for further outbreaks
– If so, it also implies re-setting the detection 
algorithm(s) after each signal
72
Issue: Need New, Consistent Methods 
for Evaluating Detection Algorithms
“…a general challenge for all 
biosurveillance research is to develop 
improved methods for evaluating detection 
algorithms in light of the fact that we have 
little data about outbreaks of many 
potential diseases that are of concern.”
73
Rolka, H., Burkom, H., Cooper, G.F., Kulldorff, M., Madigan, D., W. Wong (2007).  Issues in Applied Statistics 
for Public Health Bioterrorism Surveillance Using Multiple Data Streams: Research Needs, Statistics in 
Medicine, 26, 1834-1856.
From an Industrial SPC 
Practitioner’s Viewpoint
“Evaluations and comparisons of statistical 
performance in public health surveillance often 
involve the use of real surveillance over a past 
time period of interest.  The outbreak locations in 
time are either assumed to be known or 
outbreaks are artificially superimposed on the 
data.  As pointed out by Woodall (2006), this is 
rarely, if ever, the case in the industrial literature 
where case study-type data are used only to 
illustrate the application of methods, not to 
evaluate statistical performance.”
74Fraker, S.E., W.H. Woodall, and S. Mousavi (2008).  Performance Metrics for Surveillance Schemes, Quality 
Engineering, 20, 451-464.
Solution: Emphasize Monte Carlo 
and Focus Less on Real Data
• “Reliance on the use of Monte Carlo simulation in 
the field of Statistics is well known.  It has been this 
author’s experience that the technique is 
undervalued in the field of Public Health because it 
has previously not been required.”[1]
• At issue is breaking out of the “my data is unique” 
and “only real data is valid” paradigms
• Monte Carlo can:
– Facilitate evaluating algorithms across many scenarios
– Eliminate unneeded/distracting real world complexities
– Allow clean and clear comparisons of algorithms
– Make it easier to get at generalizable conclusions/results
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and Specificity of a Signal Detection Tool for Multidimensional Public Health Surveillance Data, Statistics 
in Medicine, 24, 551-562.
Sub-Issue: Must Be Able to Well 
Characterize Biosurveillance Data
• Valid Monte Carlo simulation depends on 
being able to appropriately characterize and 
simulate biosurveillance data
– “Appropriately” does not mean “perfectly”
– But must understand important features of (types 
of) biosurveillance data
• Both systematic and probabilistic
• Utility of Monte Carlo methods often in 
understanding broad conditions under which 
methods work better or worse
• Solution: Basic research with real data
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Issue: More Comparisons 
Between Methods Needed
• Little is known about which methods work best 
and under what conditions
– Emphasis in biosurveillance literature is on 
presenting new methods illustrated on a specific set 
of data
– Use of unique data does not permit comparisons 
across papers
– Few papers make comparisons between methods 
• In contrast, QC/SPC literature has long history 
of comparing methods under conditions that 
can be replicated
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“The body of literature on health-related 
surveillance is smaller than that on 
industrial surveillance, and is somewhat 
less mathematical in nature.”
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Surveillance, draft paper to be presented at IXth Workshop on Intelligent Statistical Quality Control held in 
Bejing, China in September 2008.
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Papers Comparing Biosurveillance 
Algorithm Performance Fit on One Slide
Solution: Foster a Culture of 
Studying Algorithmic Performance
• Recommend encouraging on-going research that 
conducts comparisons between methods under 
various conditions
• Also, promote research into characterizing data 
(normal background and outbreak) so that 
comparisons can be made on simulated data
• In my opinion, competitions (e.g., DARPA-sponsored 
Bio-ALIRT competition, 2001-2004) of limited utility
– Problem does not lend itself to a single “solution” arising from 
a competition
– Use of actual data interesting, but best performer on that data 
does not mean results are generalizble 
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Example: Comparing EARS to 
Alternative Based on CUSUM[1]
• Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) 
– Designed to be a drop-in surveillance system
– Available on the web, so increasingly being used as 
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• Sample statistics calculated from
previous 7 days‟ data
• Stop when statistic > 3
• Sample statistics calculated from
7 days‟ of data prior to 2 day lag
• Stop when statistic > 3
• Stop when statistic > 2
[1] Fricker, R.D., Jr., Hegler, B.L., and D.A Dunfee (2008).  Assessing the Performance of the Early Aberration
Reporting System (EARS) Syndromic Surveillance Algorithms, Statistics in Medicine, 27, 3407-3429.
Alternative: CUSUM on Residuals 
from “Adaptive Regression”
• Adaptive regression: regress a sliding baseline of 
observations on time relative to current observation
– I.e. regress                                on  
• Calculate standardized residuals from one day ahead 
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• Generate synthetic data:
• Scenarios:
• Outbreaks
– Linear increase & decrease
– Characterized by duration
and magnitude
 ( ) max 0, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y t c s t d t Z t o t      
None Small Large
A 0 20 80
s n/a 10 30
None Small Large
A 0 2 6
m, s n/a 1.0, 0.5 1.0, 0.7
Large count: c=90 Small count: c=0
Synthetic Data: Outbreaks?
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Some Large Count Results




























Not Suited for this Problem?
Examples of Observations Such 
Simulation Comparisons Engender
• CUSUMs based on adaptive regression 
with longer baselines performed best
• CUSUMs outperformed EARS‟ methods
– Seemingly due to Shewhart design and
additional data used in adaptive regression
• Suggests “drop in” strategy of starting 
with CUSUM with 7-day baseline
– As time progresses, increase baseline until 
long enough to allow it to slide
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Issue: Developing Methods That 
Support Both EED and SA
• Methods that both identify and track 
changes in disease patterns desirable
– Is an outbreak/attack likely occurring?
– If so, where and how is it spreading?
• Most methods focus on either early event 
detection or spatial clustering using 
aggregated (i.e., daily count) data
• Ideal: Method that uses individual-level 
data in (near) real time
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• ER patients come from surrounding area
– On average, 30 per day
• More likely from closer distances
– Outbreak occurs at (20,20)





Observed distribution of ER 
patients‟ locations
A Couple of Major Assumptions
• Can geographically locate individuals in 
a medically meaningful way
– Data not currently available
– Non-trivial problem
• Data is reported in a timely and 
consistent manner
– Public health community working this 
problem, but not solved yet
• Assuming the above problems away…
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• Construct kernel density estimate (KDE) of 
“normal” disease incidence using N historical 
observations
• Compare to KDE of most recent w+1 obs 
Idea: Look at Differences in 
Kernel Density Estimates
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But how to know when to signal?
Solution: Repeated Two-Sample 
Rank (RTR) Procedure
• Sequential hypothesis test of estimated 
density heights
• Compare estimated density heights of 
recent data against heights of set of 
historical data
– Single density estimated via KDE on 
combined data
• If no change, heights uniformly distributed
– Use nonparametric test to assess
92Fricker, R.D., Jr., and J.T. Chang (2008).  A Spatio-temporal Method for Real-time Biosurveillance, Quality 
Engineering, 4, 465-477.
Data & Notation
• Let                         be a sequence of 
bivariate observations
– E.g., latitude and longitude of a case
• Assume a historical sequence 
is available
– Distributed iid according to f0
• Followed by               which may change 
from f0 to f1 at any time
• Densities f0 and f1 unknown
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Estimating the Density
• Consider the w+1 most recent data points
• At each time period estimate the density
where k is a kernel function on R2 with 
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Calculating Density Heights
• The density estimate is evaluated at 
each historical and new point
– For n < w+1
– For n > w+1
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Under the Null, Estimated Density 
Heights are Exchangeable
• Theorem: If Xi~F0, i≤n, the RTR is 
asymptotically distribution free
– I.e., the estimated density heights are 
exchangeable, so all rankings equally likely
– Proof: See Fricker and Chang (2009)
• Means can do a hypothesis test on the 
ranks each time an observation arrives
– Signal change in distribution first time test 
rejects
97Fricker, R.D., Jr., and J.T. Chang, The Repeated Two-sample Rank (RTR) Procedure: A 
Nonparmetric Multivariate Individuals Control Charting Methodology (in draft).
Comparing Distributions of Heights
• Compute empirical distributions of the 
two sets of estimated heights:
• Use Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to assess:
– Signal at time
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Illustrating Changes in Distributions 
(again, in one dimension)
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Plotting the Outbreak
• At signal, calculate optimal kernel density 
estimates and plot pointwise differences
where
and                         or
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• Assess performance by 
simulating outbreak multiple 
times, record when RTR signals
– Signaled middle of day 5 on average
– By end of 5th day, 15 outbreak and 
150 non-outbreak observations
– From previous example:
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Distribution of Signal Day
Outbreak Signaled on
Day 7 (obs‟n # 238)
Daily Data
Same Scenario, Another Sample
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Outbreak Signaled on
Day 5 (obs‟n # 165)
Daily Data
• Normal disease incidence ~ N({0,0}t,s2I) with s=15
– Expected count of 30 per day
• Outbreak incidence ~ N({20,20}t,2.2d2I)
– d is the day of outbreak
– Expected count is 30+d2 per day
Another Example
Outbreak signaled on




signaled on day 3-1/2)
• Normal disease incidence ~ N({0,0}t,s2I) with s=15
– Expected count of 30 per day
• Outbreak sweeps across region from left to right
– Expected count is 30+64 per day
And a Third Example
Outbreak signaled on
day 1 (obs‟n # 11)Daily data
Unobserved outbreak 
distribution
(On average, signaled 1/3 
of way into day 1)
Advantages and Disadvantages
• Advantages
– Methodology supports both biosurveillance goals: 
early event detection and situational awareness
– Incorporates observations sequentially (singly) so 
can be used for real-time biosurveillance
• Most other methods use aggregated data
• Disadvantage?
– Can‟t distinguish increase distributed according to f0
• Won‟t detect an general increase in background disease 
incidence rate
– E.g., Perhaps caused by an increase in population
– In this case, advantage not to detect
• Unlikely for bioterrorism attack?
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Issue: Are the Methods 
Set Up Backwards?
• Classical hypotheses tests set up so that Type I 
error rate explicitly controlled 
• Thus, Type I error is usually the more serious of 
the two possible errors
– Example: In criminal trials, possible errors are either 
convicting an innocent person or letting a guilty 
person go free
• Our society feels sending an innocent person to prison is 
the more serious error
• Hence, the “null hypothesis” is a person is presumed 
innocent and must be proven guilty
• Type II error is then a function of the observed 
alternative (and test design)
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Errors in Biosurveillance
• In biosurveillance, the possible errors are
– Failing to detect an outbreak/attack (false negative)
– Incorrectly signaling when there is no 
outbreak/attack (false positive)
• Presumably, the first is a more significant error
– Suggests biosurveillance systems should be 
structured to presume an outbreak exists unless 
proven otherwise
• Trial example: What if the person incorrectly let 
free would release smallpox in US?
– Should the null still be innocent until proven guilty –
or should it now be guilty until proven innocent?
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• But always assuming an outbreak exists unless 
proven otherwise is impractical:
– Would consume far too many resources
– How to prove everything is normal?
• Alternate hypothesis testing design approach: 
Make the alternative hypothesis the outcome 
that requires empirical proof
– But with Type II error so serious, that implies must 
have test with high sensitivity
– Equivalent condition for sequential SPC methods, 
must have low ARL1s 
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• Current practice seems to try to mitigate 
problem by lowering detection thresholds to 
make detection time as low as possible
– Often without regard to the fact that making 
algorithms more sensitive to detecting outbreaks 
also results in more false positives
• “…most health monitors… learned to ignore alarms 
triggered by their system … due to the excessive false 
alarm rate that is typical of most systems - there is nearly 
an alarm every day!”[1]
• Alternatives:
– Develop more sensitive methods (i.e., that achieve 
same ARL1s for larger ARL0
– Use existing tests/systems more selectively
109
[1] Shmueli, G., https://wiki.cirg.washington.edu/pub/bin/view/Isds/SurveillanceSystemsInPractice.
Possible Solution: Make 
Biosurveillance Systems “Tunable”
• Can‟t watch for everything, everywhere, all the 
time and still maintain a tolerable false positive 
error rate
– Instead, design systems to be “tunable”
• One approach: set detection thresholds to 
make most likely events most detectable
– As threats change, can change thresholds
– Also, set thresholds so that Type I error rate 
constrained at tolerable level
• A preview of my Wednesday talk…
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Optimizing a County-level System 
111
Problem Set-up
• Regions (counties) are spatially independent
• Biosurveillance system monitoring standardized 
residuals from an “adaptive regression” model using 
Shewhart charts
– Model removes systematic effects in the data
– Result: Reasonable to assume F0=N(0,1) 
• An outbreak will result in a 2-sigma increase in the 
mean of the residuals, so F1=N(2,1)
• Then, maximize probability of detection subject to 
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Fricker, R.D., Jr., and D. Banschbach, Optimizing Biosurveillance Systems that Use Threshold-based 
Event Detection Methods, in submission.
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Optimizing a County-level System 
113
Thresholds Chosen as a 
Function of Probability of Attack
114
Counties with low probability 
of attack  high thresholds
• Unlikely to detect attack
• Few false signals 
Counties with high probability 
of attack  lower thresholds
• Better chance to detect attack
• Higher number of false signals 
In Summary…
• Goal was to discuss some current issues in 
biosurveillance detection algorithms
– Informed by an industrial SPC viewpoint
• In my opinion, biosurveillance research has yet 
to fully tap industrial SPC literature and 
expertise
• Other disciplines have much to offer as well:
– Operations research – optimizing biosurveillance 
system performance is a non-trivial problem
– Systems engineering – these are complex systems 
that require careful design
– Game theory – in a bioterrorism context, there is an 
autonomous, willful adversary to be accounted for
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Biosurveillance is a Hard Problem
• Posed more problems than solutions
• Purpose was to highlight some of the 
open issues, including
– Lack of standard evaluation methods and 
metrics in the literature
– Need to move beyond inappropriate metrics 
– Benefits of better defining events to be 
detected
– Utility of using more Monte Carlo methods 
for algorithm evaluation
116
But if all I‟ve done is demonstrate how sequential tests differ 
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